The EU agenda and the right of initiative. EIPA Paper June 2020. by Best, Edward
EIPA Paper  
European Institute of Public Administration
The EU agenda and 
the right of initiative
Edward Best
June 2020
2   Edward Best – The EU agenda and the right of initiative – June 2020
Dr Edward Best is Senior Expert and Head of Unit, EU Governance, at the European Institute 
of Public Administration (EIPA), Maastricht, and Senior Fellow of Maastricht University. 
Contact: e.best@eipa.eu
The views expressed 
in this publication are 
those of the author and 
not necessarily those of 
EIPA. This EIPA Paper 
may not be reproduced  
in any form without the 
prior permission of the 








Tel. +31 43 32 96 222
E-mail: info@eipa.eu
Website: www.eipa.eu
European Institute of Public Administration
Institut européen d’administration publique
The European Commission supports EIPA 
through the European Union budget
3   Edward Best – The EU agenda and the right of initiative – June 2020
A Conference on the Future of Europe was proposed by the newly elected President of the 
European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, in July 2019. It was meant to be launched on 
Europe Day, 9 May, 2020 and last until 2022. The European Commission has heralded this 
as a key part in the New Push for European Democracy, one of its six Political Priorities.1 The 
European Parliament has welcomed it, affirming that ‘10 years after the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, it is an appropriate time to give EU citizens a renewed opportunity to have a 
robust debate on the future of Europe so as to shape the Union that we want to live in together’.2 
The European Council was positive but sounded more down-to-earth in its Conclusions of 12 
December 2019, recalling that ‘priority should be given to implementing the Strategic Agenda 
agreed in June, and to delivering concrete results for the benefit of our citizens’. 
The Conference was rapidly overshadowed by the Coronavirus and arguments over the EU’s 
response. By early April, some claimed that the very future of the European project was in 
question, as arguments about common fiscal responses seemed to show an alarmingly low level 
of both agreement between EU governments and solidarity between EU peoples. 
The EU agenda and 
the right of initiative
Edward Best
Abstract
The Conference on the Future of Europe was to be launched on 9 May 2020 to debate the EU’s 
priorities, institutional matters and democratic processes. Despite its delay due to the COVID-19 
crisis, discussion of the EU’s democratic functioning is ongoing. This EIPA Paper seeks to 
shed light on one element in EU law-making that is under scrutiny, namely the exercise of the 
European Commission’s ‘right of initiative’.
The Commission, subject to few exceptions, has the sole right of initiative for legislative acts. This 
power was given to the Commission as it allows an independent actor to ensure that the general 
interest is adequately taken into account in negotiations, and to serve as a counterweight to 
differences in size between member countries. The rationale has evolved under Better Regulation 
and Better Law-Making to emphasise also the Commission’s role in guaranteeing the necessity 
and quality of initiatives in a context of broad consultation and interinstitutional cooperation.
Increased expectations regarding democratic participation, however, raise questions as to 
whether there should be a greater role for other players. The paper considers the European 
Parliament’s push to have a full right to propose legislation, perspectives for the European 
Citizens’ Initiative, and the possibility of a more proactive role for national parliaments.
By outlining the reasoning behind the Commission’s right of initiative as well as how it has 
developed, this paper aims to explain the broader institutional issues at stake in these 
discussions of EU decision-making and democratic participation in EU governance.
Introduction
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The EU will almost certainly survive, and the Conference will go ahead in some form. The 
proposal places great emphasis on massive citizen involvement in the process. Whether or 
not citizens feel massively interested in them, institutional issues will figure prominently in the 
discussions. Indeed the Franco-German Non-Paper circulated in late November 2019 suggested 
that the first phase should ‘focus on issues related to EU democratic functioning’.3 The way in 
which these issues are approached will shape not only the outcome of the Conference but also 
the perceptions of citizens. 
This series of EIPA Papers aims to contribute to both policy debate and public discussion over 
key issues in EU policy-making. The present paper concerns the EU agenda and the right of 
initiative.
The fact that the European Commission has a near-exclusive right to propose new EU legislation, 
the ‘right of initiative’ at the heart of the ‘Community method’ of policy-making, continues to be the 
focus of contention. The Paper addresses two specific questions that will be under consideration 
in this respect, while aiming also to help clarify the broader institutional issues at stake.
The first specific point is the European Parliament’s continuing demand to have its own right of 
initiative. In November 2019, Antonio Tajani, Chair of the EP Committee on Constitutional Affairs, 
confirmed that his committee would be pushing for this in the coming years, together with a 
strengthening of the Parliament’s right of enquiry: ‘The European Parliament is the only chamber 
directly-elected by citizens that does not hold the right of initiative.’4 Is this argument sufficient to 
change the Community method?
The second point concerns the interaction between the different actors who may formally request 
a Commission proposal, particularly the European Parliament and EU citizens, and between 
these processes and the other ways in which the Commission conducts consultations. How 
far have the new processes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty succeeded in ensuring that the 
Commission’s right of initiative goes hand in hand with democratic participation?
In order to discuss these points adequately, one needs first to clarify the specific context in which 
the right of initiative actually operates, and establish appropriate criteria for evaluation. The first 
section therefore summarizes the actual nature of the right of initiative and recalls the original 
reasons for which Member States gave this power to the Commission. The second assesses how 
the right of initiative has evolved in the context of Better Regulation and Better Law-Making. The 
third looks at the right of initiative from the perspective of democratic participation. It explains, 
and supports, the Commission’s rejection of the European Parliament’s demand for a stand-alone 
right of initiative, largely on grounds of Better Law-Making. It considers the state of play regarding 
the mechanisms by which the Council, the European Parliament and EU citizens may formally 
request the Commission to present a proposal, and the continuing discussion over the role of 
national parliaments. 
1. The European Commission and the right of initiative in practice
The reasons for giving the Commission the right of initiative are often forgotten, and the actual 
nature of the right of initiative is widely misunderstood.
The ‘right of initiative’ in the EU does not refer only to the process of ‘agenda-setting’, the first 
stage in the classic policy cycle, in which many other EU actors play a role. And it is more than 
the right to place an issue on the agenda of a legislature, which in Europe is generally shared 
between the government and members of the legislature itself, and may extend to citizens in 
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what is often known as an ‘agenda initiative’. It is a specific power in the Treaty of Rome that the 
Member States chose to give to an independent body, the European Commission, to help in the 
subsequent stages of ‘policy formulation’ and even of ‘decision-making’.
Where EU law is concerned, the Commission has a near monopoly on the initiative for ‘legislative 
acts’. These contain the basic rules that the Council and the European Parliament adopt, 
usually on an equal footing, based on treaty provisions. The Commission adopts other legally 
binding acts to apply those rules in a uniform way (‘implementing acts’) or to adapt those rules 
(‘delegated acts’), by virtue of powers given to it in those ‘basic acts’.
The Commission has the right to shape how the ‘legislator’ (the European Parliament and the 
Council) takes decisions. The legislator can only adopt a legislative act on a proposal that is 
drafted by the Commission, with a few specific exceptions. The Commission may modify its 
proposal in the course of negotiations in order to facilitate a decision by qualified majority. It may 
request that the Council should act by unanimity where it strongly disagrees with amendments. 
In the very last resort, the Commission can withdraw the proposal to prevent an outcome that it 
considers worse than nothing.
This right was introduced to govern the relationship between the Commission and the Council 
(which was, until 1993 and the introduction of ’codecision’, the sole legislator), and the relevant 
treaty article still refers explicitly only to the Council.5 It applies today not only to Commission-
Council interaction under the ‘consultation procedure’ that is still used in some highly sensitive 
areas and results in Council acts, and when Council is agreeing its position in the first reading 
of the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP - as codecision is now known). It also shapes the 
Commission’s role with regard to the negotiations between the Council and the Parliament that 
produce the final agreement.
Other actors share the right of initiative in a few specific cases. One quarter of the Member States 
may present ‘initiatives’ in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.6 The 
European Parliament may adopt ‘regulations on its own initiative’ (see below). The European 
Central Bank may make ‘recommendations’ for certain issues related to finance and statistics, 
while the Court of Justice7 and the European Investment Bank may submit ‘requests’ with regard 
to their statutes. 
Why did the Member States give the Commission the right of initiative?
The starting point is the concept of ‘promoting the general interest’.8 This is the primary reason 
given in the Treaty on European Union (Article 17) for the existence of an ’independent’ 
Commission.
It would be unhelpful to present this as meaning that the Commission represents a putative 
higher-level entity (a sort of superstate that is to come) which has definable interests that are 
separate from, or even opposed to, national interests. It is more appropriate to see promotion of 
the ‘general interest’ as a function in a process, a power that sovereign states delegate in order 
to help achieve common goals over time. We should not forget that the TEU establishes in its first 
article a Union ‘on which the Member States confer competences to attain objectives they have in 
common.’ (emphasis added) 
Achieving and managing ambitious goals such as a common market requires some degree of 
‘pooling of sovereignty’ and delegation of powers, according to the seriousness of the problems 
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that can be expected. The European Community was created among countries of very different 
size, as well as different interests, and the integration process could be expected to generate 
strong pressures on governments from domestic actors who were negatively affected. In this 
context, the founding countries considered the right of initiative to be necessary not only to push 
ahead with the integration process, but also to help maintain stability through what has been 
known as the ‘institutional balance’.
First and foremost was the balance between the ‘general interest’ and national interests. The 
role of the Commission would be partly to help find a compromise between national interests in 
the Council. More than that, however, it would help ‘upgrade the common interest’ (to quote the 
classic phrase of Ernst Haas) and ensure that decisions would take into account the interest of 
the community as a whole and in a long-term perspective. Often forgotten is the fact that the right 
of initiative was also intended to be a counterweight to the difference in voting power among the 
Member States. In the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome in 1956, the Dutch delegation opposed 
the weighting of votes in view of the ‘guarantee of objectivity’ that would be provided by the 
Commission’s right of initiative. The compromise reached was to stipulate that four countries out 
of the Six would be required to vote in favour, in addition to 12 out of 17 votes, if the Council were 
to act other than on a Commission proposal.9 The present system of qualified majority voting still 
features this principle. Where the Council does not act on a Commission proposal, 72% of the 
Member States are required instead of the usual 55% (i.e. 20 out of 27 in 2020, as opposed  
to 15).10 
Moreover, the right of initiative, through the possibility to request unanimity, was understood to 
give ‘an extra guarantee to Member States in the minority (usually, but not always, the “small” 
countries) in that the Council cannot push through a majority decision without the Commission’s 
consent.’11 
These two ‘political’ functions should be seen, together with the Commission’s role in ensuring 
that all Member States fulfil their obligations (the ‘Guardian of the Treaties’), as mechanisms to 
generate confidence in the fairness of the policy process. These reasons continue to be relevant 
but have been somewhat overshadowed by other considerations.
In the early 1990s, the political context in the EU became more restrictive with regard to 
legislation, giving rise to the demand for Better Law-Making, while expectations grew with regard to 
broader participation in policy processes. Against this background, the 1999 crisis of the Commission 
accelerated the move towards systematic application of evidence-based policy-making. 
Better Regulation was born in the early 2000s, as the Commission strove to rebuild its 
credentials, and to reposition itself (and the Community method) in a more complex Union facing 
multiple challenges in terms of good European Governance. As the context has evolved, so too 
has the way in which the right of initiative is exercised and justified. 
2. The right of initiative, Better Regulation and Better Law-Making
One key question has been how to ensure that the EU only works on the basis of proposals that 
are well prepared, and justified under the principles of subsidiarity (only do at European level 
what you can’t do as effectively at national level) and proportionality (only do as much as you 
need to get the job done). 
For many years the dominant approach was the perceived need to control the Commission. On the 
one hand, the Commission, like the other supranational institutions, had a political commitment to 
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ever closer union and ‘more Europe’. On the other hand, it has been feared that this independent 
body, part of whose raison d’être is to propose rules and regulations, may come up with some that 
are not really necessary, or not thought through, out of institutional/bureaucratic interest. 
This argument has, in a sense, been turned on its head since Maastricht. The emphasis in 
explaining the need for independent promotion of the general interest has shifted somewhat away 
from defence of the Commission’s own vision and ‘political’ role, towards its functional role in 
ensuring policy coherence and ‘managing legislative pressure’. 
A supranational entity should be better placed to assess individual issues in a long-term 
perspective – hence the new emphasis on foresight - and to ensure coherence with the 
overarching objectives of EU policies. It should also be better equipped in terms of technical 
capacity, as well as having the necessary independence, to manage the tasks that are required to 
support evidence-based policy-making, such as consultation, impact assessment and evaluation.
If the Commission has the exclusive right of initiative, on this view, it will be able to provide a 
better safeguard against initiatives that are unnecessary, in the sense of not reflecting priorities, 
or inappropriate, in that they represent special interests rather than ‘the general interest’. This 
of course, creates tension with those actors who feel that they should, on grounds of good 
democratic governance, be able to insist that an issue is taken up in the legislative process.
The Juncker Commission introduced a new Better Regulation Agenda in 2015, emphasising 
the importance of openness and stakeholder consultation, and of only proposing what is really 
necessary: ‘Sensible, realistic rules, properly implemented and enforced across the EU. Rules 
that do their job to meet our common objectives - no more, no less.’ The 2020 Commission Work 
Programme promised a new Communication on Better Regulation for the second quarter of 2020. 
The justification for the Commission’s role has thus increasingly focused on the ability to ensure 
the necessity and quality of initiatives in a context of broad consultation and interinstitutional 
cooperation.
The Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making (IIABL) of 201612 formalizes this slightly 
refocused version of the ‘institutional balance’. The three institutions explicitly reaffirm the 
importance of ‘the Community method’, as well as recognizing the Commission’s treaty-based 
duty to initiate interinstitutional programming. However, the Agreement also provides that the 
Commission will systematically discuss initiatives in advance with the EP and the Council. The three 
institutions now adopt an annual Joint Declaration on Legislative Priorities for the following year.
This repositioning at the level of legislative activity should be seen in the broader perspective 
of institutional adjustment since Lisbon. At the strategic level too, the Commission seems to be 
establishing a new balance with the other institutions. When presenting her Political Guidelines in 
July 2019, Ursula von der Leyen seemed to define the Commission both as an independent body, 
and one that is sensitive to input from both institutions equally: ‘I have consulted far and wide and 
have inspired myself from my discussions with the political groups in the European Parliament, as 
well as from the European Council’s Strategic Agenda for 2019-2024.’ 
One can observe a similar trend regarding the preparation of ‘delegated acts’, by which 
the Commission may be empowered ‘to adopt non-legislative acts of general application to 
supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of the legislative act.’13 The Commission 
consults, adopts the act, and submits it for scrutiny and possible ‘objection’ by either co-legislator. 
There is no ex ante control by the Member States in a ‘comitology committee’ as is the case 
for ‘implementing acts’. Delegated acts are explicitly ‘non-legislative’ and do not come under 
the Commission’s right of legislative initiative. However, within the limits set by the legislator 
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in the basic act, the treaty seems to provide a certain margin of discretion for the Commission 
in deciding how to ‘flesh out’ the basic act. Immediately after the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the Commission published a Communication emphasizing that ‘the Commission enjoys 
a large measure of autonomy in this matter’. It would carry out broad consultations, including 
with national experts, but in a purely consultative capacity.14 After several years of argument 
with the Council, including two court cases, the Commission shifted the emphasis in its position 
away from autonomy in technical assessment and towards preliminary consensus building with 
the co-legislators. The revised Common Understanding annexed to the 2016 IIABL requires 
the Commission systematically to consult experts from all Member States, and both the EP and 
the Council may send experts to Commission expert groups dealing with delegated acts. More 
important in practice is that the Commission has, as also foreseen in the IIABL, become much 
more pro-active in discussing and explaining what it is doing in advance of adoption, notably in 
EP Committees.
Finally, however, there continues to be discussion over the balance between the Commission’s 
more ‘political’ role in promoting its own convictions, and its functional role in finding general 
solutions, at the stage of interinstitutional negotiations.
The other institutions have recognized that the Commission continues to enjoy the right of 
initiative at first reading in the OLP, but expect it also to help bridge their positions. The 2007 Joint 
Declaration on practical arrangements for codecision (which is still generally relevant) thus states 
that:
‘Appropriate contacts shall be established to facilitate the conduct of proceedings at first reading. [..] The 
Commission shall facilitate such contacts and shall exercise its right of initiative in a constructive manner 
with a view to reconciling the positions of the European Parliament and the Council, with due regard for 
the balance between the institutions and the role conferred on it by the Treaty.’15
 
The Court of Justice has given a rather nuanced ruling on the status of the Commission vis-à-
vis the co-legislators. In 2013, the Commission withdrew a proposal to prevent the co-legislators 
from adopting a text (for the first time in nearly 20 years), arguing that it represented a serious 
distortion of its proposal. The Council challenged this before the Court, and lost. The Court ruled 
in 2015 that: ‘[t]he power of withdrawal […] cannot […] confer upon that institution a right of 
veto in the conduct of the legislative process, a right which would be contrary to the principles 
of conferral of powers and institutional balance.’ However, ‘the Commission’s power under the 
ordinary legislative procedure does not come down to submitting a proposal and, subsequently, 
promoting contact and seeking to reconcile the positions of the Parliament and the Council’.16
Nevertheless, the Commission is still held sometimes to go too far when assisting in the informal 
interinstitutional negotiations known as ‘trilogues’. Looking back at the 2014-2019 term, the 
EP has complained that the Commission has been ‘adapting its role at stages of the legislative 
procedure which are the preserve of the co-legislators. [...] it is also sometimes apparent during 
trilogue negotiations: the Commission’s commitment to proposing compromises and resolving 
disputes between the Parliament and the Council has always been a key feature of legislative 
negotiations, and it should continue to play the role of honest broker and facilitator during such 
three-way discussions.’17
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3. The right of initiative and democratic participation
This brings one to the broader concerns related to good governance and, in particular, norms of 
democratic participation. Some argue that this virtual monopoly on the initiative is a ‘technocratic’ 
function that is no longer appropriate. The Commission is independent, which for some people 
is the reason for its existence but for others a cause to denounce it as being ‘unelected’. Those 
who are less enthusiastic about the EU sometimes suggest that its proposals should largely 
be dictated by the Member States, whose governments are elected, and subject to control by 
national parliaments.
Others argue that the directly elected European Parliament should, at the very least, share the 
right of initiative. In an era in which new forms of direct democracy and citizens’ participation have 
come to be expected, should not citizens be able to oblige the Commission to deliver proposals 
on issues that they think have to be addressed? 
The European Parliament
The EP already has a treaty-based right of initiative in a few special cases, all of which are of an 
institutional, rather than normative, nature. It has both the exclusive right of initiative and the right 
of consent regarding provisions for elections of its members, but the Council adopts the act. The 
EP may adopt ‘regulations on its own initiative’ in three cases. These concern the duties of its 
Members, the duties of the Ombudsman, and the exercise of the EP’s right of inquiry. Although 
the EP is to adopt the act, however, it always requires the consent of the Council and, over the 
right of inquiry, the consent of the Commission as well. 
This last case has proved problematic. The EP presented an initiative in 2014 that the other 
institutions held to pose fundamental concerns of a legal and institutional nature. Both Council 
and Commission refused to negotiate on that basis, leaving the EP stuck with its initiative. The 
EP rapporteur could only lament in late 2018 that: ‘it is practically impossible to negotiate with the 
Council and the Commission and to study whether there is a margin for reaching agreements, 
since they are only obliged to give their consent or not to Parliament’s proposal, but not to 
negotiate it. Unfortunately, in contrast to what happens when it is the Council or the Commission 
that submits their proposals, Parliament has not been able to sit at the negotiating table.’18  
This frustration may contribute to the present demand to give the EP a more clear-cut power.
The EP does have the formal right (Article 225 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU)) to request a proposal, and has often presented quite detailed indications as 
to what it would like to see. The EP is not satisfied with how the Commission has responded. 
According to a 2019 study, out of 26 cases between 2010 and 2019, the Commission followed up 
the Parliament’s request to some extent with a proposal in only eight cases.19 
The EP therefore continues to press for the full right of initiative, but it is not entirely clear what 
this would mean in practice. Here, it is important to emphasise the difference between the 
agenda-setting phase of initiative, and the subsequent phase of policy formulation.
The EP has considerably strengthened its internal ‘technical’ capacity, with the establishment in 
2012 of a Directorate for Impact Assessment and European Added Value ‘to equip the EP with 
an administrative capacity to support its agenda-setting function’.20 This results in Cost of Non-
Europe Reports that present overall arguments for new policy developments, and European 
Added Value assessments that set out in detail the justification for requests under Article 225 
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TFEU.21 The EP has also increased its ability (more so than the Council) to provide supporting 
analyses for substantial amendments made after the proposal has been submitted by the 
Commission. 
Would it be either feasible or desirable for the EP to develop a parallel capacity to elaborate 
legislative proposals with the same rigour and quality that is now expected of the Commission? 
In a majority of European countries, whatever the origin of the initiative, ‘most drafts are 
elaborated within the ministries. The prevalence of the executive in the exercise of the legislative 
initiative implies that most laws are, in practice, initiated by the Government […] the Ministries 
have the manpower and the expertise to prepare bills.’ 22 In the EU, this will equally be one of the 
core tasks of the Commission.
In reality, the idea of a stand-alone EP right of initiative comes down to whether the Commission’s 
‘independence’ should in some cases be interpreted as requiring it to give neutral technical 
support for drafting proposals to pursue the objectives proposed in the political agenda of the 
legislature.
However, the new Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen reiterated when presenting 
her Political Guidelines in July 2019 that the Commission, while being more responsive to EP 
concerns in shaping EU priorities, would maintain its formal rights precisely on the grounds of 
Better Law-Making:
‘I support a right of initiative for the European Parliament. When Parliament, acting by a majority of its 
members, adopts resolutions requesting that the Commission submit legislative proposals1, I commit to 
responding with a legislative act, in full respect of the proportionality, subsidiarity and better law making 
principles. To make this process as effective as possible, I will ask my Commissioners to work hand-in-




Much the same applies to requests from citizens. Pressure to provide a formal possibility for 
citizens to be involved in agenda setting led to inclusion of the European Citizens’ Initiative 
(ECI) in the Treaty at Lisbon. A citizens’ committee of at least seven EU citizens from at least 
one quarter of the Member States may submit an initiative to the Commission. The Commission 
‘registers’ it so long as procedural requirements are fulfilled; it does not manifestly ‘fall outside the 
framework of the Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union for the 
purpose of implementing the Treaties’; and it is neither ‘manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexatious’ 
nor ‘manifestly contrary to the values of the Union’. If an initiative collects over one million valid 
statements of support from at least seven Member States, the Commission is obliged to respond 
within (now) six months. Initial enthusiasm and activism quickly gave way to disappointment. 
The 2011 Regulation installed a process that proved complicated and burdensome, while the 
first successful initiatives seemed to bring no result in terms of legislative initiative from the 
Commission. 
The Regulation was finally revised, the new version coming into force in 2019,23 leading to 
simplification of the process, and the ECI seemed reinvigorated. As of May 2020, 97 initiatives 
had been submitted to the Commission, of which 74 had been ‘registered’, and five had been 
‘successful’. Of these, two so far have contributed to shaping legislative initiatives: Right2Water 
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contributed to revision of the Drinking Water Directive, and Stop Glyphosate to revision of the 
General Food Law.24 The Commission only started to examine the fifth, Minority Safepack, on 10 
January 2020.
Campaigners still generally feel that the ECI lacks teeth, and that the Commission should be 
obliged to draft a legislative proposal for each (and any) successful initiative. The Commission is 
not going to accept this, for the reasons outlined above, and there are other ways to address the 
concern expressed, for example, in the recommendations adopted at the 2020 ECI Day that,  
‘[c]itizens’ participation at the European level must always have a clear link to the formal decision-
making process in order to make it meaningful.’ Indeed, these recommendations include not only 
working with the European Parliament but also that national parliaments should hold a debate 
and a vote on each successful ECI prior to the Commission decision on follow-up.25
A sort of compromise seems to be emerging by which the ECI may be formally linked with other 
agenda-setting processes with the aim of ensuring broad political discussion and consideration 
of possible legislative initiatives with the co-legislators themselves. Under the revised Regulation, 
the Commission transmits successful initiatives to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
advisory bodies and national parliaments, all of which may attend the public hearing in the 
European Parliament. ‘Following the public hearing, the European Parliament shall assess the 
political support for the initiative.’26 The EP Rules of Procedure now foresee that the EP may  
use its formal right to request a proposal on a successful initiative if the Commission fails to 
submit one.27 
National parliaments 
Whereas the European Parliament has been most concerned with its ability to prompt new 
proposals, discussion of the role of national parliaments at EU level has mainly focused on how 
to control the Commission in exercising its right of initiative. The Lisbon Treaty introduced a 
mechanism for subsidiarity control (or ‘check’) by national parliaments. All legislative proposals28 
must be sent to national chambers, each of which has eight weeks to send a ‘reasoned opinion’ 
to the Commission. Each country has two votes. If one third of the total votes (one quarter in 
the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters – the same policy area in which 
the Commission shares the initiative with one quarter of the Member States) are negative, the 
Commission must review the proposal and give reasons if it decides not to amend or withdraw 
the proposal. There have been three cases as of May 2020. The Commission withdrew the 
proposal in the first case, but for other reasons. This mechanism was dubbed the Yellow Card 
from the sporting image of warning a player, and this process (often referred to as the Early 
Warning System by academics but less so among practitioners) did sound purely negative.29 
Interest grew in finding means for national parliaments to act in a more positive light.
A parallel process had already been initiated in 2006, now known as the ‘political dialogue’, by 
which the Commission consults national parliaments. The national chambers can send back 
‘opinions’, which may be positive, on any aspect of the proposal. The idea of a ‘Green Card’30 
emerged in 2013. The Dublin Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of 
Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC) ‘call[ed] on the Commission to consider within 
the existing context of political dialogue any individual or collective requests from national 
Parliaments for new legislative proposals’. Two ‘green card’ initiatives were then presented, one 
in July 2015 led by the House of Lords on a strategic approach to the reduction of food waste co-
signed by 16 chambers and another in July 2016 by the French Assemblée Nationale co-signed 
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by eight chambers. Both received a formal response from the Commission.31
In 2015 COSAC formally proposed the Green Card as a sort of ‘enhanced political dialogue’. 
This would allow ‘willing national parliaments to play a proactive role in the EU agenda-setting 
process with a view to contribute further to the good functioning of the EU [through] constructive 
non-binding suggestions regarding policy or legislative proposals to the European Commission, 
without undermining the Commission’s right of legislative initiative […]’.32 
The Commission has welcomed this attitude, but consistently rejected the idea of formalizing this 
as a new procedure. The key point for the Commission and for many others is that, while national 
parliaments can and should help bring the EU and citizens closer together in terms of feeling, the 
EU and national levels of governance should be kept separate in terms of function.
‘The Commission recognises that national Parliaments, as the representatives of Europe’s citizens at 
national level, play an important role in bridging the gap between European institutions and the public. 
The Commission continues to respect the balance between the institutions active on a European level, 
and is mindful of its right of initiative.’33 (emphasis added) 
The idea is often discussed of promoting common efforts between national parliaments and the 
European Parliament. However, although there have been statements of EP support in the past,34 
the EP has generally indicated a preference for keeping things at EU level – and not doing anything 
that could weaken its own position in this respect. Expressions of openness to further dialogue with 
national parliaments have generally been set in the framework of the EP’s own formal right to request 
legislative proposals under Article 225.35 Even as new structures for multi-level ‘interparliamentary 
cooperation’ have evolved between the EP and national parliaments in key policy areas (police 
cooperation, economic governance, CFSP/CSDP), the EP has maintained its insistence on keeping 
EU- and national-level roles separate when it comes to legislation. Moreover, following the principle 
that the primary role of national parliaments relates to national governments, the EP in 2017 in fact 
made the novel suggestion that green cards could be sent not to the Commission but to the Council, 
which could then – like the EP – exercise a right of legislative initiative.36
The EP’s position was reasserted in 2018, this time with regard to suggestions made by national 
parliaments to the Commission.
‘ …the Commission could enjoy the discretion either to take on board such proposals or to issue a 
formal response underlining its reasons for not doing so; […] such a procedure cannot consist of a 
right of initiative, or the right to withdraw or amend legislation, as it would otherwise subvert ‘the Union 
method’ and the distribution of competences between national and European level, thus violating the 
Treaties; recommends, meanwhile, that in the event of a future revision of the Treaties, the right of 
legislative initiative should be accorded to the European Parliament, as the direct representative of  
EU citizens;’37
On the other hand, efforts to develop joint initiatives using Article 225 could also run into concerns 
on the part of national parliaments, for example that the EP would be claiming credit for their 
work.38 Indeed, when asked in the past, only six out 30 responding chambers thought the EP 
should be involved at all.39
While the von der Leyen Commission will be expected to at least maintain the current openness 
to national parliaments, it is unlikely that any green card procedure will be formalized, nor that 
there will be any major shift in interaction between national parliaments and the EP in this 
respect. Among those who believe that a system of multi-level governance is desirable, few would 
argue that this separation of levels is incompatible with basic principles of good, democratic 
governance.
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Conclusions
The Commission’s right of initiative has adapted remarkably successfully to the changes in the 
European community since the 1950s. This is a process of institutional evolution that will continue.
At this stage, the Commission’s position seems appropriate in response to the demand to give 
a full, stand-alone, right of initiative to the European Parliament. Stronger interaction in defining 
priorities with the EP, as with the Council, together with closer technical cooperation, can boost 
the political legitimacy of Commission initiatives without losing the benefits of the Community 
method.
When it comes to democratic governance, it is important to recall that participatory democracy 
and representative democracy need to be mutually reinforcing. Otherwise, there is a danger that 
promotion of direct participation may undermine the legitimacy of parliaments. One should also 
perhaps more confidently reassert the traditional idea that Commission consultations are one 
source of legitimacy for the ‘Community method’, just as the Constitutional Treaty recognised 
‘broad consultations’ by the Commission in themselves as one component of participatory 
democracy. 
An optimistic view is that the different strands of participation – citizens’ initiatives, national 
parliaments and the European Parliament – will come to interact between themselves as well as 
with Commission consultation to improve not only legislation but also legitimacy.
This new setting is more complex and multidimensional than in the past, and perhaps harder to 
understand. On the other hand, more openings now exist for Member States and stakeholders 
to be involved, and to contribute to EU policy-making from the beginning, if one knows how to go 
about it. 
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